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legislatures and state and local bar associations in providing for legal
counsel for all criminal defendants who could not otherwise afford
this distinct advantage. s
R. Bruce LaBoon
The Constitutional Problem of Providing Venue
Classification for Foreign Corporations in Texas
A state can refuse to permit a foreign corporation to conduct busi-
ness within the state;' consequently, it can provide conditions which
must be complied with to obtain admittance.! Although wide dis-
cretion is given a state legislature in making different classifications
and in placing restrictions on those classes," the surrender of con-
stitutional rights cannot be the price of admission.' In providing con-
"Allison & Hassett, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 41 J. Am. jud. Soc'y 102
(1957).
' This is so because the transaction of intrastate business within a state is only a privilege
and not a right of the corporation. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937),
the corporation conceded that the federal constitution does not confer upon it the right
to engage in intrastate commerce in Virginia unless it has secured the consent of the state.
Whether the privilege should be granted to a foreign corporation is a matter of state policy.
In Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1933), the corporation contested a provision allowing substituted service on foreign cor-
porations in the event it withdrew from the state. The court said that the state need not
have admitted the corporation to do business within its borders at all. The state's prohibition
of any intrastate public service business was upheld in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931). A state tax provision taxing foreign corporations more than
domestic corporations of the same class was declared unconstitutional in Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926), because the foreign corporation was not placed on
the same basis as a similar domestic corporation once the foreign company obtained ad-
mittance. In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868), it was held that a corporation was a
legal creation of a state, and therefore had no legal existence outside the state. Hence, the
recognition of its existence by other states depends entirely on the comity of those states,
dependent on their own interests. There is no absolute right of recognition and they may
therefore be excluded. Also, in State v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., - Tex. _-, 353
S.W.2d 412 (1962), it was held that the state could prevent an insurance corporation from
doing business in the state if it performed certain acts which the state prohibited, viz., the
insurance company was excluded for writing certain types of insurance. The state's right
to exclude a corporation and its successor for violation of the state anti-trust law was up-
held in Pierce Oil Corp. v. Weinert, 106 Tex. 435, 167 S.W. 808 (1914).
'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Virginia, supra note 1; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra
note 1; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens,
178 U.S. 389 (1900); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28 (1900); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. McCallum, 118 Tex. 46, 10 S.W.2d 687 (1928); Pierce Oil Corp. v.
Weinert, supra note 1; State Mut. Life Assur. Co. v. State, 345 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961), reV'd on other grounds, 163 Tex. 240, 353 S.W.2d 412 (1962).
a Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding,
272 U.S. 494 (1926); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); State Mut. Life
Assur. Co. v. State, supra note 2.
'Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931).
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ditions for admittance, a state may not make such arbitrary restric-
tions that the foreign corporation is denied equal protection of the
laws.'
Legislatures can provide different classifications so long as they
are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the classification is
made' and have a rational relationship to the legislative policy.' The
classification must rest upon some ground of difference having a
real and substantial relation to the subject of the legislation! If the
classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of
the equal protection of the law.9 That a statute discriminates against
a certain class does not render it arbitrary if the discrimination is
founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy. 0
Different classifications of persons for venue purposes are com-
monly made by state legislatures. The classifications pertinent to the
present discussion fall into four broad categories: residents, non-
residents, domestic corporations, and foreign corporations. Since non-
residents may be and always have been treated differently from
residents, such a classification is generally valid." Moreover, there is
an obvious difference between a corporation and an individual person
that allows different statutory treatment."' Various state statutes
provide a separate classification of domestic and foreign corpora-
'Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1932); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529
(1922); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 1 (1910). See Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926), for a
catalogue of illegal conditions provided by states which have been declared unconstitutional.
. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Power Mfg. Co. v.
Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra note 6.
'Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saun-
ders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
' Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra note 8; State Board of Tax Comm'rs v.
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573
(1910).
1°Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
"Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931); Conner v. Willet, 265 Ala. 319,
91 So. 2d 225 (1956); Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10
S.E.2d 46 (1940); State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionales De Mexico v. Rutledge, 331 Mo.
1015, 56 S.W.2d 28, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 746 (1932); Wilson & Co. v. Hickey, 186 Okla.
324, 97 P.2d 564 (1939); State ex rel. Blackledge v. Latourette, 186 Ore. 84, 205 P.2d
849 (1949).
"Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, supra note 11, upheld subdivision 23 against the contention
that it was unconstitutional because it provided a wider venue for actions against corpora-
tions than was provided for actions against an individual. Accord, Grayburg Oil Co. v.
Powell, 118 Tex. 354, 15 S.W.2d 542 (1929).
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tions,' s although they are sometimes treated as one class for venue
purposes."
The leading decision on discriminatory venue provisions, Power
Mfg. Co. v. Saunders," was decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1927. An Arkansas statute allowed a foreign cor-
poration (whether or not authorized to do business in the state) to
be sued in any county of the state on a transitory cause of action. A
domestic corporation could be sued only in counties wherein it was
doing business or was maintaining an office, officer, or agent. The
majority"s of the United States Supreme Court stated that there
were subjects as to which foreign corporations could be classified
differently from domestic corporations, but that such differences in
classification must rest on differences pertinent to the subject in
respect of which the classification is made.' Here the Court decided:
"So far as their situation [i.e., foreign corporations authorized to do
business in Arkansas having a fixed place of business and an author-
ized agent on whom process may be served] has any pertinence to
the venue of transitory actions it is not distinguishable from that of
domestic corporations and individuals."'" Consequently, the statute
was held to be invalid because the classification and discriminatory
treatment of foreign corporations was without reasonable basis and
was essentially arbitrary.
The Saunders case provided the basis for attacks on foreign cor-
poration venue statutes. In order for the state venue provision to be
struck down, the difference in the classification of foreign and
domestic corporations must be arbitrary and unreasonable"0 and must
"E.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 3-206 (1962), 22-1509, 22-1511, 22-1601 (Supp. 1963);
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 542.09-.10 (1945); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1433, 1437, 5342 (1956);
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 508.010, 508.040 (1949); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.36, 2307.38
(Page 1953); Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 12, § 1309, and Pa. R. Civ. P. 2078, 2079.
"E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 395; Ill. Rev. Star. ch. 110, §5 5, 6 (1955), in which
domestic and foreign corporations authorized to do business in the state have the same
residence. A foreign corporation not authorized to do business is considered a nonresident;
Mich. Comp. Laws §5 600.1621, 600.1625 (1948); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1433, 5342 (1956),
which provide identical venue for qualified foreign corporations and domestic corporations;
N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 503(c), which abrogated the case law with respect to foreign corpora-
tions and treats foreign corporations authorized to do business in the state as residents of
the county wherein their principal office is located.
'5274 U.S. 490 (1927), hereinafter referred to as Saunders.
" Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented. See note 19 infra.
"Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1927).
18 Id. at 494.
19 Ibid. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting: "A foreign corporation merely doing business in
the state and having its works elsewhere will be more or less inconvenienced by being sued
anywhere away from its headquarters, but the difference to it between one county and
another is likely to be less than it will be to a corporation having its headquarters in the
state." Id. at 498.
"0 Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927); see also Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), which considered an Ohio statute that classified
domestic and foreign corporations differently for a particular tax purpose.
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have no reasonable state policy supporting it. However, state courts
have been very reluctant to strike down venue provisions; thus, the
Saunders case frequently has been distinguished. 1
Several of the cases2 that have distinguished Saunders dealt with
nonresident statutes. The reasons for classifying nonresidents differ-
ently from residents, either individuals or corporations, are not
applicable to foreign corporations which have submitted to the state
laws and have registered and established an office or designated agents
in the state. Such a corporation, although technically a foreign cor-
poration, has a domicile in the state, a residence in the state,"5 or an
agent on whom service may be made as authorized by state laws, and
it is therefore much more amenable to suit than a nonresident who
has no domicile or residence in the state. The Saunders case dealt
exclusively with the foreign corporation authorized to do business
in the state."
In other cases that have distinguished Saunders," the party con-
tended that a particular statute allowed a change of venue for one
party but not for another and therefore denied equal protection of
the law. These cases are not directly on the point of available
original forums; they turn on the right to transfer a case from a
proper venue. The leading case on statutes of this type, Cincinnati
St. Ry. v. Snell,"6 was decided prior to Saunders and established
a broad rule considered determinative by several courts" that have
distinguished Saunders. The rule is:
" Metropolitan Cas. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Panzram v. O'Donnell, 48
F. Supp. 74 (S.D. Minn. 1942); Conner v. Willet, 265 Ala. 319, 91 So. 2d 225 (1956);
Long v. General Petroleum Corp., 11 Cal. App. 2d 708, 54 P.2d 1147 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936); Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, 124 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1960); Lloyd Adams, Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d 46 (1940); Hercules Powder Co. v. Tyrone,
155 Miss. 90, 124 So. 74 (1929); Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273
(1932); Wilson & Co. v. Hickey, 186 Okla. 324, 97 P.2d 564 (1939); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P.2d 184 (1936); State ex rel. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co.
v. Updegraff, 171 Ore. 246, 141 P.2d 251 (1943).
" Conner v. Willet, 265 Ala. 319, 91 So. 2d 225 (1956); Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 21; Wilson & Co. v. Hickey, supra note 21.
2a See note 45 infra.
24 Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 494 (1927). The Oregon Supreme Court
correctly distinguished Saunders on the simple fact that foreign and domestic corporations
were treated alike under the Oregon venue statutes. State v. Updegraff, 171 Ore. 246, 141
P.2d 251 (1943); see also Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, 124 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1960). Neither
relied upon Saunders.
" Hercules Powder Co. v. Tyrone, 155 Miss. 90, 124 So. 74 (1929); see also Witort v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N.W. 934 (1929).
'6 193 U.S. 30 (1904), distinguished in Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 495
(1927).
27Conner v. Willet, 265 Ala. 319, 91 So. 2d 225 (1956); Long v. General Petroleum
Corp., 11 Cal. App. 2d 708 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177
Okla. 539, 61 P.2d 184 (1936); see also Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273
(1932), and Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fields, 181 Okla. 231, 73 P.2d 164 (1937), the
former relied on Snell without distinguishing Saunders, and the latter distinguished Saunders
and relied on Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, supra.
NOTES
[I] t is fundamental rights which the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards
and not the mere forum which a State may see proper to designate for
the enforcement and protection of such rights. Given therefore a con-
dition where fundamental rights are equally protected and preserved, it
is impossible to say that the rights which are thus protected and pre-
served have been denied because the State has deemed best to provide for
a trial in one forum or another. It is not under any view the mere
tribunal into which a person is authorized to proceed by a State which
determines whether the equal protection of the law has been afforded,
but whether in the tribunals which the State has provided equal laws
prevail."8
A domestic corporation in the Snell case contended that it was denied
equal protection of the laws because an individual plaintiff had the
right to transfer an action to another county although the cor-
porate defendant had no such right. The action properly was begun
in the county wherein the corporate defendant did its principal busi-
ness and had its principal office; the statute allowed transfer to
another county upon plaintiff's claim and affidavits that he could
not get a fair trial in the county of suit. The statute allowed such
transfer by the plaintiff if the corporate defendant had fifty stock-
holders or more. The sole contention was that equal protection was
denied because equal opportunity to transfer the cause was not
afforded the corporate defendant. The right to be sued in the county
wherein the corporation did its principal business was not questioned;
the statute was challenged because the corporation had no power to
transfer the action elsewhere, i.e., away from the county wherein it
did its principal business. The Missouri Supreme Courts' succinctly
expressed the Snell decision as follows:
The opinion holds that classification made as to corporations having
50 stockholders or more was not unreasonable, and that it was in the
power of the Ohio Legislature to provide that a plaintiff in a suit against
a corporation having 50 stockholders or more, which was pending in
the county where the corporation keeps its principal office or transacts
its principal business, may change the venue to some other county if he
shall make an affidavit that he cannot have a fair trial in the county
where the suit is instituted . . .o
2s 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904). The Court concluded: "It follows that the mere direction
of the state law that a cause under given circumstances shall be tried in one forum instead
of another . . . can have no tendency to violate the guarantee of the equal protection of
the laws where in both the forums equality of law governs and equality of administration
prevails." Ibid.
"
9McClung v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 279 Mo. 370, 214 S.W. 193 (1919), which
foreshadowed the Saunders decision holding the Arkansas venue statute unconstitutional.
See also Grocers' Fruit Growing Union v. Kern County Land Co., 150 Cal. 466, 89 Pac.
120 (1907).
"0McClung v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., supra note 29, at 198.
1964]
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The Snell decision expresses the unanimous belief that a state may
make different classifications of individuals and corporations. No
distinction between foreign and domestic corporations was involved,
but the broad rule established by Snell3 has since been applied to
differences in classifications of foreign and domestic corporations."
On the other hand, decisions that have relied upon Saunders ap-
pear to fall into two categories. The venue statute is either declared
unconstitutional33 or construed so that domestic and foreign corpora-
tions receive the same treatment thereunder." In either situation the
courts generally have dealt with a statewide venue provision. There
seems to be no justification for allowing statewide venue against
foreign corporations if they are authorized to do business in the state,
are not considered as nonresidents," and have a designated or regis-
tered office therein, unless the same provision is available for suits
against domestic corporations.
The Texas venue statute commences with the general rule: "No
person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the
county in which he has his domicile. . . ,"" The words "domicile"
and "inhabitant" have been interpreted to mean "residence" or
"resident."" The remainder of the venue statute is thirty-four sub-
divisions or exceptions to this general rule.
If a plaintiff commences an action in a county that is not the
county of residence of the defendant, the defendant has the right to
31 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
"Conner v. Willet, 265 Ala. 319, 91 So. 2d 225 (1956) (the rule was applied to resi-
dents and nonresidents); Long v. General Petroleum Corp., 11 Cal. App. 2d 708, 54 P.2d
1147 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P.2d 184 (1936).
" Fisher Packing Co. v. Mattox, 262 Ky. 318, 90 S.W.2d 70 (1936); State ex rel. Twin
City & So. Bus Co. v. District Court, 178 Minn. 72, 225 N.W. 915 (1929); Windham v.
Pace, 192 S.C. 216, 6 S.E.2d 270 (1939); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Torrez, 359 S.W.2d 559
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error dism. w.o.j.; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 327
S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).34 Bohn v. Better Biscuits, Inc., 26 Cal. App. 2d 61, 78 P.2d 1177 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938); Smith v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 234 Minn. 169, 47 N.W.2d 785 (1951); Witort
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N.W. 934 (1929); State ex rel. Oakland
Motor Car Co. v. District Court, 176 Minn. 78, 222 N.W. 524 (1928); Sandford v. Dixie
Constr. Co., 157 Miss. 626, 128 So. 887 (1930); see also Hercules Powder Co. v. Tyrone,
155 Miss. 90, 124 So. 475 (1929), distinguished by Sanford v. Dixie Constr. Co., supra;
State ex rel. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 171 Ore. 246, 141 P.2d 251 (1943).
35 See notes 33, 34 supra; see also Wilson & Co. v. Hickey, 186 Okla. 324, 97 P.2d
564 (1939), which distinguished Saunders because of the statewide venue provision.
3"See Long v. General Petroleum Corp., 11 Cal. App. 2d 708, 54 P.2d 1147 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1936), in which a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the state of
California was considered a nonresident for venue purposes.37Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 (1950).
" Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, 29 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), mand. ref.,
121 Tex. 405, 48 S.W.2d 982 (1932); 14 Tex. Jur. 2d Corporations § 471 (1960); see
also Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926); Pearson
v. West, 97 Tex. 238, 77 S.W. 944 (1904).
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file a plea of privilege to be sued in his county of residence," which,
if sustained, will cause the action to be transferred to defendant's
county of residence."' To maintain venue in the county in which the
action is pending, a plaintiff must file a controverting plea alleging
that the defendant resides there or that some subdivision of article
1995 authorizes venue." At a venue hearing preceding the actual
trial,' the plaintiff must plead and prove the applicable venue facts
that allow suit under one of the thirty-four subdivisions to the gen-
eral venue rule.4 If he sustains this burden of proof, the action can
be maintained properly in the county of suit, and the plea of privilege
is overruled.
A domestic corporation is considered a person" under the Texas
venue statute and is a resident for venue purposes in the county in
which its registered office is located.' A foreign corporation author-
ized to do business in Texas is a resident of the county, for venue
purposes, wherein its principal office is situated.4 ' Doing business in
Texas without a permit does not preclude a foreign corporation
from urging a plea of privilege to be sued in the county of its
principal office.4 ' Doing business in the state together with the main-
tenance of an office appear to make a foreign corporation a resident
"Tex. R. Civ. P. 86.
40 Tex. R. Civ. P. 89.
4' Tex. R. Civ. P. 86.
' Tex. R. Civ. P. 87.43 Jefferies v. Dunklin, 131 Tex. 289, 115 S.W.2d 391 (1938); Crawford v. Sanger,
160 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
"Evans v. American Publishing Co., 118 Tex. 433, 13 S.W.2d 358 (1929); Pittsburg
Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926).
"' Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., - Tex. -, 364 S.W.2d 194 (1963), noted in
17 Sw. L.J. 340 (1963), in which the county of the registered office was held to be the
statutory residence of the corporation. Prior to the Ward case, the county of residence was
considered the county in which the principal office was located. United States Furniture
Corp. v. Twilite Mobile Homes Mfg. Co., 355 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), in which
the court said the legislature intended that the designation of a registered office should
have the effect, for venue purposes, of designating the principal office. In Magnolia Petroleum
v. Broussard, 340 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error dism. w.o.j., the court stated
that the residence of a domestic corporation is the place or places designated in the charter
as the principal office or the place where the principal office is in fact located; Southwestern
Indem. Co. v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 310 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), in
which the county wherein the corporation's principal office was maintained was considered as
its residence. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
"A foreign corporation authorized to do business in the state is a resident for venue
purposes. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 59 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, 29 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); it is a resident of
the county wherein its principal office is located. Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan,
115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926). In International Harvester Co. v. Faris, 360 S.W.2d 864
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962), it appears that the court considered residence to be in the county
wherein the principal office was located, although it made no clear distinction between the
county of residence, county of principal office, and county of registered office. See also Jaques
Power Saw Co. v. Womble, 207 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
" Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, 211 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
McMullen v. Burton Auto Spring Corp., 138 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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for venue purposes. ' However, if the foreign corporation does not
have a residence,49 then it cannot take advantage of the general venue
provision to be sued in its county of domicile (residence)."
Foreign and domestic corporations have been classified separately
by the Texas legislature. Domestic corporations may be sued under
subdivision 23,ai and foreign corporations doing business in Texas are
subject to suit under subdivision 27." If a foreign corporation is sued
under subdivision 27, the plaintiff has a wider choice of counties in
which to commence suit than does a plaintiff suing a domestic cor-
poration under subdivision 23. Subdivision 27 provides this wider
venue by allowing suit "in any county where such [foreign corpora-
tion] may have an agency or representative ... ,, A similar pro-
vision was deleted from subdivision 23 by amendment in 1943.'
Prior to this amendment, subdivisions 23 and 27 were practically
identical, both allowing suit in any county wherein a corporation had
an agency or representative.5" In its present form subdivision 23
48 Mergenthaler Lintoype Co. v. Herrmann, supra note 47, at 635.
4 Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Faris, 360 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Jaques Power Saw
Co. v. Womble, 207 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). From these cases it appears that
the residence of a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Texas is the county wherein
the principal office is located. However, the court in International Harvester seems to equate
registered office and principal office as the corporation's residence.
" Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, 211 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
Aviation Credit Corp. v. University Aerial Serv. Corp., 59 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) error dism. w.o.j.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995, § 23 (1950):
Corporations and Associations. - Suits against a private corporation, associa-
tion, or joint stock company may be brought in the county in which its prin-
cipal office is situated; or in the county in which the cause of action or part
thereof arose; or in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time the
cause of action or part thereof arose, provided such corporation, association or
company has an agency or representative in such county; or if the corporation,
association, or joint stock company had no agency or representative in the
county in which the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action or part
thereof arose, then suit may be brought in the county nearest that in which
plaintiff resided at said time in which the corporation, association or joint
stock company then had an agency or representative. ...
s Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1995, § 27 (1950):
Foreign corporations. - Foreign corporations, private or public, joint stock
companies or associations, not incorporated by the laws of this State, and doing
business within this State, may be sued in any county where the cause of
action or a part thereof accrued, or in any county where such company may
have an agency or representative, or in the county in which the principal office
of such company may be situated; or, when the defendant corporation has no
agent or representative in this State, then in the county where the plaintiffs or
either of them, reside.
But see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Price, 364 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), which
found that subdivision 23 applied to both foreign and domestic corporations.
'3 Ibid.
14 Texas Acts 1943, 48th Legislature, ch. 228. The purpose of the amendment as stated
therein was to clarify existing law and remove the uncertainty and confusion as to the
venue of suits against certain classes of corporations and certain classes of causes of action.
" Subdivision 23 was originally passed in 1874. Texas Acts 1874, ch. 34, 8 Gammel, Laws
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allows suit in the county of plaintiff's residence if the corporation has
an agency or representative therein, or if not, then in the nearest
county in which the corporation has an agency or representative."
Moreover, the 1943 amendment introduced the requirement of
proving a cause of action at a venue hearing against a domestic cor-
poration if the suit is brought outside the county wherein the principal
office is located."7 Subdivision 27 does not require such proof for an
action commenced in a county in which the foreign corporation has
an agency or representative,"8 thereby making it easier for a plaintiff
to sustain venue.
Subdivision 27 was declared unconstitutional in Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. McDaniel"s in so far as it provided -a wider venue in suits
against foreign corporations than subdivision 23 provided in suits
against domestic corporations. The court of civil appeals traced the
legislative history of subdivisions 23 and 27, recognized the in-
equalities between the provisions-notably the necessity of plaintiff's
proving a cause of action by the preponderance of the evidence in
order to maintain venue against a domestic corporation, while no
such necessity exists to maintain venue against foreign corporation-
and held that the subdivision was discriminatory and unconstitutional
as a matter of law."0 Subdivision 27 is not as broad as the Arkansas
statute" considered in the Saunders case; however, foreign corpora-
of Texas 32 (1874). It subsequently became Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1198, § 21 (1879),
and was carried forward without substantial modification into Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 1995, § 23 (1925). Subdivision 27 was enacted in 1885 and is essentially the same as
first enacted, with the exception of the deletion of a service clause. See Texas Acts 1885, ch.
83, 9 Gammel, Laws of Texas 699 (1885). See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel,
327 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), which traces the legislative history of both excep-
tions. See also Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926),
in which the court found there was no distinction made for venue purposes between domestic
and foreign corporations.
56 See note 51 supra.
"
7Jackson v. Hall, 147 Tex. 245, 214 S.W.2d 458 (1948); East Tex. Motor Freight Line
v. Jackson, 216 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); see also Furr's, Inc. v. Behringer, 340
S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Lary v. American Indem. Co., 297 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wagner, 288 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956). Prior to 1944, proof of a cause of action was not essential when the plaintiff relied
upon the location of an agent or representative in the county of suit. The 1943 amendment,
therefore, increased the plaintiff's burden under this exception. 1 McDonald, Texas Civil
Practice § 4.30, at 397 (1950).
"SAndretta v. West, 318 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Pacific
Fin. Corp. v. Ramsey, 305 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Southwestern Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Day, 238 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
5s 327 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), followed in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Torrez,
359 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error dism. w.o.j., noted in 14 Sw. L.J. 390
(1960).60327 S.W.2d 358, 365-68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
61 Crawford & Moses Digest § 1174 (1921). The Arkansas statute allowed a suit against
a foreign corporation on a transitory cause of action to be brought in any county in the
state. The Texas provision in question, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995, § 27 (1950),
allows a plaintiff to sue in any county in which the foreign corporation has an agency or
representative.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tions in Texas still may be sued in more counties than may domestic
corporations." The wider venue, coupled with the lack of the neces-
sity of proving a cause of action on the venue hearing in order to
sustain venue in the county of suit against a foreign corporation,
appears to be discriminatory on its face. Assuming that it is dis-
criminatory, is it unreasonable and arbitrary to require proof of a
cause of action against domestic corporations and not foreign cor-
porations in order to maintain venue outside the county of residence?
In Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams" a Texas court was again faced
with the question of the constitutionality of subdivision 27. In this
case suit was commenced against a foreign corporation in the county
in which the plaintiff resided and in which the corporation was doing
business and had an office and an authorized agent." The defendant
corporation admitted it was a foreign corporation doing business in
Texas with an agent in Harris county. However, the corporation
filed a plea of privilege to be sued in its county of residence, wherein
its principal office was located, and challenged the constitutionality
of the statutory provision allowing the plaintiff to sue in a county
wherein the corporation had only an agency. The district court over-
ruled the plea of privilege; the court of civil appeals affirmed"s and
held subdivision 27 not to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to be
unconstitutional. The supreme court agreed with the decision of the
court of civil appeals and refused the writ of error."
The court of civil appeals set forth a standard to be applied in
determining the validity of a discriminatory classification." A court
must consider: (1) whether the difference does injustice to the class
generally in that the same and equal laws are not applicable and
administered in the forum provided; (2) whether the difference is
pertinent to the subject with respect to which the classification is
made; and (3) whether the discrimination is founded upon any
reasonable distinction or difference in state policy."s The discrimina-
tory provision of subdivision 27 to which these rules were applied
allows suit in any county in which the foreign corporation has an
2 The degree of the discrimination should have no effect if the provision violates the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930); Looney v. Crane, 245 U.S. 178 (1917). See also 11 Am. Jur. Con-
stitutional Law § 88 (1938).
63 366 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. per curiam, -Tex.-, 369 S.W.2d
927 (1963).
The court never reached the question whether venue might be sustained under sub-
division 23, which allows a corporation to be sued in the county of the plaintiff's residence
when the corporation has an agency or representative therein. 366 S.W.2d at 809.
0" Commercial Ins. Co. v. Adams, 366 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
"6..Tex , 369 S.W.2d 927 (1963).
67 366 S.W.2d at 807.
08 Ibid.
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agency or representative. The absence of such a provision in sub-
division 23, applicable to domestic corporations, was the basis for
contesting the validity of subdivision 27." The contention was that
subdivision 27 was unconstitutional in so far as it allowed a wider
venue for actions against a foreign corporation than was afforded for
actions against a domestic corporation under subdivision 23. The
same argument was advanced in the Fireman's Fund case.
Three reasons were given by the court of civil appeals that go to
the policy for establishing the venue class of foreign corporations
doing business in Texas: (1) the difficulty of a plaintiff in locating
the principal office of a foreign corporation not authorized to do
business in the state, (2) the possibility of an authorized foreign
corporation designating as its principal office a county remote from
its actual business operations, and (3) the problem of securing serv-
ice on a foreign corporation. '
These reasons seem to apply to the problem of locating and serving
a foreign corporation rather than to the proper venue of an action
against a foreign corporation. They offer no basis for a distinction
between the different venue rules applicable to foreign and domestic
corporations. A plaintiff need not locate the principal office of a
foreign corporation not authorized to do business in the state in
order to bring suit. Service may be obtained by serving the Secretary
of State under article 2031 1 if service cannot be made on an agent
of the corporation. The problem of service seems to be obviated by
such provision. Moreover, the proper venue is not necessarily the
county in which the foreign corporation's principal office is located,
as subdivision 27 provides other alternatives."2
Under the Texas Business Corporation Act an authorized foreign
corporation does not designate a principal office, as the court of civil
appeals states," but rather designates a registered office." The regis-
tered office apparently is its statutory place of residence for venue
purposes according to a recent Texas Supreme Court case." Although
69366 S.W.2d at 808.
70 Ibid.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031(b) (1959); see also Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 2031(a) (1950).
72 See note 51 supra.
73 366 S.W.2d at 808.
"
4 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.08 (1955).
W1Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., -Tex._ 364 S.W.2d 194 (1963), noted in 17
Sw. L.J. 340 (1963). Although the court held that the registered office established the
statutory residence of the corporation for venue purposes, it did not say that this was the
only residence for venue purposes. However, it is questionable whether a domestic corpora-
tion still has a residence in the county wherein its principal office is located. See Ricks-
Maguire Co. v. Oliver, 373 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), in which the court held
that a domestic corporation's residence for venue purposes was the county in which its
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that case dealt with the residence of a domestic corporation, there
appears to be little reason why the designation of the registered office
of a foreign corporation should not also establish a statutory residence
for a foreign corporation. However, no Texas court has ruled on
the matter as yet.
Assuming that the court of civil appeals meant that an authorized
foreign corporation may designate its registered office in a county
in which it does little or no business, and which is far from its actual
business, the court's reasoning can similarly be applied to a domestic
corporation. There is no necessity that the registered office and the
principal office be in the same county. s A domestic corporation may
designate its registered office far from its actual business. However, it
seems unlikely that a foreign corporation would establish its principal
office in a remote county. Such action would appear to be economi-
cally unfeasible for either a domestic or foreign corporation.
Generally, the original reason for making a distinction between
domestic and foreign corporations was that a domestic corporation
was incorporated in the state in which it did its principal business,
whereas a foreign corporation usually had only casual contacts with
the state. State legislatures therefore made it easier to sue a foreign
corporation. However, under present conditions many corporations
that do their principal business in one or more states may incorporate
in another to take advantage of the corporate law of that state. Small
corporations which do their business principally in one state may be
excepted. To consider corporations that incorporate in one state
but do their principal business in one or more other states as foreign
corporations in the states wherein they do their principal business
appears to be unsound. These corporations are not foreign in the
sense that they have only casual contacts with the states in which
they do business; they are foreign only in the sense that they have
incorporated in another state to take advantage of the difference in
the corporate law of the state of incorporation and the states in which
they do business. The reason for making the original distinction
appears to have less force under present conditions, particularly with
respect to authorized foreign corporations.
An authorized foreign corporation doing business in Texas is a
resident for venue purposes of the county in which its principal
office is located." It must designate a registered office and an agent
designated registered office was located, even though the corporation's principal office had
been moved to another county, and cited the Ward case, supra, as authority that a corpora-
tion's domicile is the county of its registered office.
7 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.09 (1955).
7 See note 4 5 supra.
[Vol. 18
upon whom service may be made. 8 It is subject to the same rules as
domestic corporations under the Texas Business Corporation Act."
Thus, an authorized foreign corporation is similar in most respects
for venue purposes to a domestic corporation, although the venue
statute clearly discriminates against the authorized foreign corpora-
tion by allowing suit in any county in which it has an agency or
representative.
A provision allowing a wider venue for actions against foreign
corporations does not in itself appear to be unreasonable or arbitrary.
However, there is another factor present, viz., no cause of action
must be proved against a foreign corporation to sustain venue in a
county in which the foreign corporation has an agency or representa-
tive as must be proved against a domestic corporation under sub-
division 23 if sued outside its county of residence." There seems to
be no valid reason to require proof of a cause of action against a
domestic corporation in order to sustain venue when there is no such
requirement of proof against a foreign corporation. However, the
court of civil appeals merely notes"' the consideration of the problem
by the Fireman's Fund case and does not itself discuss it. It is sub-
mitted that this combination of inequalities, viz., a wider venue as
well as the absence of any requirement of proof of a cause of action
to sustain venue, caused subdivision 27 to be held unconstitutional
in the Fireman's Fund case.
A state cannot exercise the degree of control over foreign corpora-
tions which have not been authorized to do business in the state that
it can over domestic corporations. This seems to require, or at least
to allow, a separate classification that may be discriminatory. A
wider venue for actions against such corporations does not seem un-
reasonable or arbitrary. However, to discriminate against the defend-
ant corporation by requiring no proof of a cause of action at a venue
hearing on a plea of privilege does appear unreasonable. The degree
of control a state may exercise over foreign corporations seems to
have little relation to the lack of a requirement of proving a cause
of action to sustain venue, unless the provision is considered as a
restriction to which a foreign corporation must submit if it fails to
obtain a certificate of authority to do business in the state.
The degree of effective control a state has over an authorized
foreign corporation is not comparable to that capable of being exer-
78 See note 74 supra.
8 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.02 (195 5).
8o See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
8' 366 S.W.2d at 803.
12 327 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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cised over a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in the
state. The authorized foreign corporation clearly appears to be dis-
criminated against unreasonably by subdivision 27 in comparison
with subdivision 23 and domestic corporations.
A distinction should be made between foreign corporations which
have obtained a certificate of authority to do business in the state
and those merely doing business without state authorization. They
have dissimilar characteristics for venue purposes. An authorized
foreign corporation and domestic corporation should be afforded sub-
stantially similar venue treatment. 3 Under the present law all foreign
corporations doing business in Texas (whether or not they have
obtained a certificate of authority) may be sued in any county in
which they have an agency or representative. In addition no cause
of action need be proved to sustain venue therein. This combination
seems an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination against authorized
foreign corporations as compared to domestic corporations because
these two classes of corporations are so similar.
John M. Stephenson
" For an example of such a classification, see Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 5-6 (1955).
§ 5: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every action must be com-
menced (a) in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good
faith and with probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against
him and not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (b) in
the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of
which the cause of action arose. If all defendants are nonresidents of the State,
an action may be commenced in any county.
§ 6: For purposes of venue, the following definitions apply: (I) Any private
corporation or railroad or bridge company, organized under the laws of this
state, and any foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state
is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office or
is doing business. A foreign corporation not authorized to transact business in
this state is a nonresident of this state.
A similar provision would appear to be appropriate for Texas.
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